Healthcare.gov: Opportunity out of Disaster by Cundiff, Jacob et al.
Teaching Case 
Healthcare.gov: Opportunity out of Disaster 
Jacob Cundiff 
Taylor McCallum 
Andrew Rich 
Michael Truax 
Tamara Ward 
Douglas Havelka 
Information Systems and Analytics Department 
Farmer School of Business 
Miami University 
Oxford, Ohio, 45056, USA 
douglas.havelka@miamioh.edu 
ABSTRACT 
The launch of HealthCare.gov, the website of the Affordable Care Act (AKA Obamacare), was a major public relations 
disaster for the Obama administration. This case examines some of the factors that contributed to the failure of the launch and 
then details how Optum, an information technology service provider, considered the opportunity provided by the failure. The 
case provides examples of both good and bad IT management processes and poses questions for discussion related to the 
evaluation of risk associated with high profile projects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Andrew Slavitt, group executive vice president of Optum, 
had just hung-up the phone with Marilyn Tavenner. Marilyn 
was the US Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) administrator.  He had called Marilyn to offer his 
company’s assistance in repairing the healthcare.gov, which 
had continued to unravel weeks after its disastrous rollout.  
The troubled launch of the U.S. federal government's 
healthcare information exchange was a high-profile example 
of a failed outsourced IT project. The $400 million dollar 
endeavor was intended to be a one-stop, online shop for 
Americans seeking health insurance. It made headlines for its 
bugs and glitches. Even Jay Leno quipped: “I tried to log on 
to healthcare.gov today. I don’t think I'm doing it right. I lost 
300 bucks playing Texas Hold 'Em.” 
Aside from the launch being the brunt of  late-night talk 
show hosts opening lines it was endorsed by the highest 
executive in the world, President Barak Obama, and was a 
key driver of his performance ratings.  The project was 
afforded plenty of lead time and a relatively straightforward 
mandate, but deadline after deadline was missed on the 
multi-contractor project. From government agencies slow 
response times to address specification questions to last 
minute changes to the Healthcare.gov's primary features. The 
project was problematic to say the least. 
As he sat in his office, Andrew wondered if he had made 
the best decision.  He also knew his parent company; 
UnitedHealth Group (UHG) had been wary from the 
beginning of embracing the Healthcare.gov rollout which 
meant Optum might not be able to rely on any of UHG’s 
resources to assist should they need it. Or his efforts may 
even hinder UHG plans of expanding with the new reform 
around the Affordable Care Act. Additionally, there were 
concerns regarding public conflicts of interest related to 
Steve Larsen. Steve had been a former top regulator with 
CMS. He was now working for OptumInsight, the UHG 
subsidiary that had purchased QSSI, a small company that 
had responsibility for one of the few components of the 
website that worked on the October 1 rollout.  If Optum were 
granted the healthcare.gov contract opportunity, QSSI would 
be a critical executor of the work given its exchange 
experience. 
Andrew was confident in his company’s capabilities; 
however, if granted the contract to fix healthcare.gov there 
would be a lot of visibility and added pressure.  There was a 
lot at stake, but there was also a lot of potential upside too. 
This could open the door for Optum to receive large federal 
or even international contracts in the future. It would also 
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open the door to other government contract opportunities 
working with individual states agencies on mimicking the 
federal healthcare exchange rollouts. If successful this 
relationship with Optum and the U.S. Government would 
also allow for future service opportunities for UHG 
administering healthcare benefits for government employees, 
a market of which UHG had minimal penetration.  
The downside was also significant. Should Optum fail, 
they could seriously damage their reputation and the 
reputation of UHG which has consistently been ranked at the 
top of the industry. Given the amount of press on the website 
launch there was a lot at stake for Slavitt and his team. 
 
2. HEALTHCARE.GOV BACKGROUND 
 
In March 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). It was the 
culmination of a protracted, partisan political battle so 
affiliated with the President himself that it was more 
commonly referred to as Obamacare by both supporters and 
opponents. The ACA included provisions on healthcare 
exchanges, subsidies, and insurance mandates for individuals 
and businesses. States could create their own exchanges; if 
they did not, their citizens could find insurance through the 
federal ACA system (in the end, 36 states relied on the 
federal system). The consumer-facing website, 
HealthCare.gov, was seen as critical to the successful 
implementation of the program. 
HealthCare.gov was to be a clearinghouse of individual 
health insurance plans. The site would allow citizens to 
“comparison shop” for plans. All individuals were required 
to have health insurance by February 2014. HealthCare.gov 
would also assess whether individuals were eligible for 
healthcare subsidies (people earning less than four times the 
poverty level) and provide details for any available Medicaid 
options. 
The government outsourced the front-end interface to a 
young company, Development Seed. The back-end bid was 
primarily granted to CGI Federal, a subsidiary of the 
Montreal-based CGI Group (CGI further subcontracted work 
on the website). Experian and Quality Software Services, 
Inc. were charged with authenticating the identity of the 
users. The project would be managed by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), whom many 
thought ill-suited for the task. People associated with the 
project predicted issues early. Henry Chao, chief information 
officer of CMS, said, “Let’s just make sure it's not a third-
world experience.” 
The website creators had hoped it would withstand 
50,000-60,000 simultaneous users, but testing by an 
independent auditor just before the October 1, 2013, launch 
showed the website slowed with just 1,100 concurrent users.  
 
3. THE PROBLEMATIC LAUNCH 
 
On October 1, the worst case came true. At launch, the site 
saw 250,000 simultaneous users, with 8.1 million visitors in 
its first four days. An estimated 1% of visitors were able to 
actually enroll with a health insurance plan. Further, some of 
the applications that were submitted were missing 
information.  
HealthCare.gov was initially built by 55 contracted 
agencies and was one of the most complex pieces of 
software ever created for the U.S. federal government which 
had a poor track record for implementing programs related to 
health services. The site was intended to communicate in real 
time with at least 112 different computer systems across the 
country. Allowing consumers to price shop for health 
coverage while validating demographic and financial 
information with one click. 
One of many problems began when the Obama 
administration decided a month prior to launch to exclude a 
feature that would let people shop for insurance without 
creating an account. This created one of the major 
bottlenecks due to the fact that the basic registration 
information was needed in order to purchase a health plan. 
Consumers were required to enter duplicate information into 
various screens causing increased frustration with the 
system. This faulty communication between applications 
within the site made the shopping experience a nightmare.  
Stories of HealthCare.gov’s technical failures dominated 
the news. One woman recounted being told to "please be 
patient" by customer support 40 times. Computer experts 
found ways to confound the system causing data loss. The 
site and implementation were battered in the news by 
independent journalists, as well as partisans and politicians 
from both parties. 
Three weeks after the website launch, President Obama 
apologized for the botched operation and promised a fix: 
“But the problem has been that the website that's 
supposed to make it easy to apply for and purchase the 
insurance is not working the way it should for everybody. 
There's no sugarcoating it. The website has been too slow. 
People are getting stuck during the application process.” 
By the end of 2013, over $500 million had been spent on 
a website that only worked for a small percentage of users, 
despite repeated efforts. Deemed critical to the success of the 
legislation itself, the rollout was eroding public support for 
the program. The program which the New York Times called 
“the most expansive social legislation enacted in decades.”  
Paul Ford, writing for Bloomberg BusinessWeek on the 
shortcomings of HealthCare.org: 
“Fixing what ails healthcare.gov will be costly and 
politically contentious. But it’s also an opportunity to learn 
why things went wrong and make sure these problems don’t 
repeat.” 
 
4. SLAVITT’S VISION 
 
Dating back to his ascension to Group Executive Vice 
President in 2007, Slavitt believed building customer 
relationships was essential for Optum to remain a thriving 
force within the healthcare industry. As a means to favorably 
position the organization, Slavitt held that Optum should 
focus on servicing opportunities presented by ample sized 
clients.  
“We won’t be a company that does lots and lots of work 
for lots and lots of companies,” Andrew contended. “We’ll 
become increasingly a company that does more work for 
fewer, bigger clients that are increasingly important to us; 
and we in turn will become increasingly important to them.” 
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 Slavitt knew that big-time opportunities would not just 
fall into his lap. In order to successfully implement 
Andrew’s strategy Optum would need to seek out, identify, 
and create opportunities with vast potential. Simply 
obtaining the opportunity would not be enough. Andrew 
knew that proper action and execution was the lifeblood to 
success. 
“We need to mobilize troops,” Slavitt explained. “We 
need to figure out how to problem solve, and we need to land 
on the on the ground.” 
When CMS began to experience well publicized issues 
with the implementation of healthcare.gov and the 
Affordable Health Care Act, Slavitt saw the type of 
opportunity he coveted. Herein was a chance for Optum to 
work with a large client on a task which Andrew firmly 
believed his company was exceptionally positioned to 
address. Conversely, Slavitt knew he had his work cut out 
for him in order to build unanimous support for undertaking 
such a daunting task. The unusual publicity of the situation 
was something relatively foreign to Optum. This would be 
one of the first times the firm decided to undertake work 
entrenched so greatly under the public microscope and more 
importantly with the U.S. Government. 
“It’s a situation where first of all I think not everyone 
would have raised their hand and run towards the problem,” 
Slavitt explained. “Ultimately, lots of people in the 
organization decided it was the right thing to do because it 
needed to be done and we were in a position to help.”  
 
5. OPTUM BACKGROUND 
 
Optum was created in 2011 as a result of the consolidation of 
a number of health services business held by UnitedHealth 
Group. The company has over 65,000 employees and 
provides services in nearly 150 countries. Optum’s primary 
focus was on improving the health care system itself through 
more efficient customer engagement, streamlining care 
delivery, and modernizing the health care information 
infrastructure. To achieve its goals Optum separated into 
three divisions with different focus areas: OptumHealth, 
OptumRx, and OptumInsight.  OptumHealth works with 
employer groups, government agencies, and directly with 
individuals to manage and coordinate health care through a 
variety of health improvement programs.  OptumRx provides 
pharmacy benefit management services, including 
processing drug prescriptions and improving the level of 
quality and safety within pharmacy related programs.  
Finally, OptumInsight provides consulting services, business 
process outsourcing, and software and information systems 
solutions to a variety of companies and groups within the 
healthcare industry. 
 QSSI was purchased by UnitedHealth Group in 
September 2012. QSSI was a privately held Columbia, 
Maryland based software and information services company 
that specialized in security and privacy, software engineering 
and health IT.  QSSI was founded in 1997 and made a name 
for itself by providing high quality solutions to a variety of 
customers, including the U.S. Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS).   
 When Health and Human Services (HHS) announced 
that CMS would be responsible for building out the new 
health insurance exchange under the Affordable Care Act, 
QSSI placed a bid to serve as the principal contractor.  QSSI 
lost the bid, but won a smaller contract worth $84.5 million 
to build the “data hub” that would allow information to flow 
between the exchanges and other U.S. agencies.  The other 
two primary pieces of the healthcare.gov project were 
building the front-end for use by the public and performing 
extensive testing of the entire system. 
 The purchase of QSSI by UnitedHealth Group came just 
months after QSSI was chosen by Health and Human 
Services (HHS) to help set up the new government 
sponsored health care insurance website.  This acquisition 
aligned QSSI with OptumInsight providing for even more 
robust information and technology enabled health services 
under UnitedHealth Group. 
 Shortly before the acquisition a top regulator at CMS, 
Steve Larson, left and began to work for OptumInsight.  This 
led to a number of questions from regulators related to QSSI 
working on the new healthcare exchange as to whether it 
posed a conflict of interest as QSSI was now part of UHG 
which owned OptumInsight.  
 
6. THE FIX 
 
On October 25, 2013, Optum/QSSI was named general 
contractor for HealthCare.gov. In that role, the company 
helped identify, prioritize, and manage the key steps 
necessary to improve the site’s performance. At that time, 
error rates on HealthCare.gov were as high as six percent, 
and the site’s response time exceeded eight seconds. 
Optum/QSSI, in the wake of its successful short-term 
assignment as general contractor for the federal public 
healthcare exchange, had agreed to a new contract with U.S. 
Government as senior advisor on HealthCare.gov. 
They discovered that not only was it poor planning of the 
launch and lack of employee engagement and buy-in that 
hindered the success of the initial launch, but a severe lack of 
coordination among the contractors. They needed to get the 
contractors working with the speed and urgency of a high-
tech company rather than a normal government operation 
and they needed to enhance the coordination, collaboration, 
and communication of the various contractors involved. 
They implemented daily progress reports to ensure that work 
status was current and keeping up with schedule. At least 50 
bug fixes were made weekly, bringing the number of fixes 
up to more than 400. More importantly they were able to 
stabilize the site to handle the estimated capacity. 
After hardware updates and bug fixes, the federal health 
exchange site now has the capacity to serve 50,000 people at 
a time, for a total of 800,000 people a day, according to a 
report issued by the Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
In its advisory capacity for the overall federal 
marketplace, Optum/QSSI would assist with project 
oversight, technical integration, code review, and other 
project tasks. QSSI would continue its work as contractor for 
the registration function of the website. Optum/QSSI would 
also develop and implement a data services hub, the central 
function of the federal exchange which connects and routs 
information among trusted data sources. 
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“Having helped lead the interim effort to deliver a site 
and system through which a majority of Americans who 
wanted insurance could obtain it, we are pleased to continue 
to support CMS in an advisory capacity as the next phase of 
this work begins,” said Andy Slavitt.  
“Optum/QSSI, which stepped up in October to serve as 
our general contractor, had been integral in fixing 
HealthCare.gov,” said Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. “We are pleased Optum/QSSI 
will remain a key part of our leadership team and will 
continue to advise us as we work together to help millions of 
Americans sign up for quality, affordable health insurance.” 
“Optum/QSSI has been a central part of our team in 
delivering a positive consumer experience through 
HealthCare.gov and we are pleased they will continue to 
provide integration and technical advice to us as we move 
into our next phase of work – making sure that the site 
continues to serve consumers well for the duration of open 
enrollment and is further enhanced to meet future needs,” 
said Marilyn Tavenner, Administrator, Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services. 
By the end of December, error rates were consistently 
less than one-half percent and the site was consistently 
performing with response times of less than one second. The 
troubled launch of the U.S. federal government's healthcare 
information exchange was a high-profile example of 
outsourced IT gone wrong. The $400 million project, which 
was supposed to be a one-stop online shop for Americans 
seeking health insurance, made headlines for its many 
glitches. 
The initiative was endorsed by the highest executive in 
the world, initially had plenty of lead time, and had a 
relatively straightforward mandate. With deadline after 
deadline being missed on the multi-contractor project for a 
variety of reasons -- from government agencies slow to issue 
their specifications to last minute changes to the 
HealthCare.gov’s primary features. 
Slavitt and his team had pulled it off, healthcare.gov was 
up and running. It was able to enroll 80% of users 
completing applications within minutes. As Slavitts’ drafted 
his year end closing statement to the organization he 
reflected on the project and if the resources needed to 
complete this task was worth the risk. Had Optum gained the 
notoriety to truly separate itself from UHG’s shadow?  More 
importantly how could Optum help CMS prevent such a 
catastrophe in the future? 
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